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ABSTRACT 
 
A loan guarantee occurs when a company guarantees payment of an affiliate’s loan. Conflicting arguments 
regarding loan guarantees provided to affiliates have prevailed. First, some suggest that loan guarantees provided 
to affiliates would decrease firm value because they are contingent liabilities (Shim, 1996; Berkman, Cole & Fu, 
2009). Second, others suggest firm value is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large 
because loan guarantees would be regarded as a positive indicator of future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The purpose of 
this study was to present additional empirical evidence of these arguments.  
 
The result of this study showed that cost of debt is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is 
large. This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when the amount of loan guarantees 
provided to affiliates is large because they regard loan guarantees as contingent liabilities. Therefore, this result 
supports the assertion that loan guarantees decrease firm value. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 loan guarantee occurs when a company guarantees payment of an affiliate’s loan. Loan guarantees 
allow companies to easily take out loans, be granted lower interest rates or borrow more from 
creditors. However, a company that provides loan guarantees to affiliates might incur the 
responsibility of paying the loan in the event of default. Therefore, a loan guarantee might be regarded as a 
contingent liability because it can reduce the value of a provider (Shim, 1996; Berkman et al., 2009). However, 
providing loan guarantees to affiliates can be interpreted as a signal that a company has sufficient liquidity or can be 
equal to future liability. Therefore, investors would evaluate this signal positively and highly value the firm (Lee, 
2005). 
 
In order to present empirical evidence on the conflicting characteristics of loan guarantees, this study analyzes their 
effect on cost of debt. If loan guarantees are more likely to be contingent liabilities, creditors would demand higher 
risk premiums, and the cost of debt would increase. However, if the loan guarantee’s signaling effect is stronger than 
its effect as a contingent liability, creditors would interpret this as a signal of liquidity and accept a lower risk 
premium. The cost of debt would decrease in this case. Liu, Cullinan, Zhang and Wang (2016) found that Chinese 
guarantors’ cost of debt is higher than that of other firms. This result suggests that Chinese creditors regard loan 
guarantees as contingent liabilities. However, this study’s generalizability is limited because of its use of only 
Chinese data and the index variable to determine whether a company provides loan guarantees or not.  
 
Previous studies of loan guarantee characteristics have presented conflicting results. This study provides additional 
empirical evidence of these conflicting results through an empirical analysis of the relationship between loan 
guarantees and cost of debt. 
 
The following section includes a literature review of cost of debt and loan guarantees. This study’s hypothesis is 
developed in the third section. In the fourth section, the research model is explained. The results of the empirical 
analysis are shown in the fifth section. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the sixth section. 
  
A
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Cost of Debt 
 
There are many previous studies of the determinants of cost of debt. Sengupta (1998) found that high corporate 
disclosure quality decreases cost of debt. Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Harris (2002) discovered that accounting 
conservatism has an effect on cost of debt. Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Shipper (2004) found that earnings quality 
has an effect on cost of debt. Leuz and Verrechia (2004) found that accounting information quality is negatively 
associated with cost of debt. This finding is because information risk is high, and investors demand a high risk 
premium when the quality of accounting information is poor. Pittman and Fortin (2004) found that firms audited by 
a Big 6 auditor may pay lower costs of debt than those who are audited by a non-Big 6 auditor. They suggested that 
cost of debt is lower in such cases because Big 6 auditors enhance the credibility of financial statements and 
decrease debt-monitoring costs. Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Shipper (2005) ascertained that accrual quality is 
negatively associated with cost of debt. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) analyzed the relationship 
between corporate governance and firms’ credit ratings, finding that the number of blockholders and CEO power are 
both negatively associated with ratings. They also found that takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, 
board independence, board stock ownership and board expertise are positively associated with credit ratings. Fortin 
(2007) found no significant association between Big 4 auditor retention and either yield spreads or credit ratings. 
Jiang (2008) found that beating earnings benchmarks decreases cost of debt. Dhaliwal, Gleason, Heitzman and 
Melendrez, (2008) found that non-audit fees are positively associated with cost of debt in investment-grade firms. 
They also found that audit and non-audit fees decrease the negative association between earnings and cost of debt in 
investment-grade firms. Kim, Simunic, Stein and Yi (2011) found that private firms with voluntary audits enjoy 
lower costs of debt than private firms with no audits.  
 
2.2. Loan Guarantees Provided to Affiliates 
 
Loan guarantees serve to supplement credit for affiliates seeking to raise funds through loans. Affiliates can raise 
funds with lower interest rates and increase the amount of funding received through this strategy. Although 
companies do not lend money directly to affiliates in this case, loan guarantees to affiliates can have a similar effect 
as lending money directly to affiliates because they lower interest rates or increase credit lines. Stein (1997) insisted 
that the internal capital market is able to decrease a transaction cost and improve resource allocation efficiency. 
Thus, internal capital market growth can increase affiliate firm values. Chang and Hong (2000) found that internal 
capital markets, such as debt payment guarantees, can make up for the inefficiency of external capital markets, such 
as banks or stock exchanges. Johnson, LaPorta and Lopez-De-Silanes (2000) suggested that loan guarantees offer a 
legal way of tunneling into emerging markets and developed countries. Doh and Ryu (2004) asserted that loan 
guarantees may indicate a lack of agency problems or government intervention. Berkman et al. (2009) found a 
significant negative relationship between loan guarantees and the value of Chinese firms providing loan guarantees. 
Liu et al. (2016) investigated the effect of loan guarantees on the cost of debt in China, finding that firms which 
provide loan guarantees experience higher costs of debt. 
 
However, results from Korean firms have differed. Shim (1996) found that loan guarantees are negatively associated 
with abnormal stock returns for Korean firms providing loan guarantees. Lee (2005) found that firm value and the 
amount of providing loan guarantees are positively correlated in Korean samples. Because of these conflicting 
results, an in-depth investigation of the effect of loan guarantees on firm value is needed. 
 
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous studies have found that the value of a firm that guarantees its affiliates’ loan decreases (Shim, 1996; 
Berkman et al., 2009). However, some research has suggested that guaranteeing affiliate loans provides a good 
signal to investors because it indicates sufficient future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The contingent liability perspective 
suggests that firm value will decrease when it provides a loan guarantees to affiliates because this company bears 
contingent liability. As the amount of loan guarantees increases, this value decreases because the amount of 
contingent liability increases. However, if loan guarantees provided to affiliates signal positive future cash flow, 
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investors would highly estimate firm value. Thus, firm value is estimated to be higher as the amount of a loan 
guarantee increases. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed. 
 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between the amount of loan guarantees provided to 
affiliates and the cost of debt of firms providing loan guarantees. 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1. Research Model 
 
The model that is used to investigate the hypothesis is as follows. 
 𝐶𝑂𝐷$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽)𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐷$ + 𝛽-𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$ + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉$ + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴$ + 𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑂$ + Σ𝐼𝐷 + Σ𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀$ (1) 
 
where 
 
CODt : cost of debt in year t; 
LGRDt : 1 if the amount of loan guarantees provided for affiliates divided by total assets at the end of year t is 
bigger than the median of the amount of loan guarantees for affiliates divided by total assets, 
otherwise 0; 
SIZEt : natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year t; 
LEVt : debt ratio at the end of year t; 
ROAt :  return on assets in year t; 
CFOt :  proportion of operating cash flow on total assets of year t; 
ID : industry dummy; 
YD : year dummy; 
 
COD is the cost of debt, which is defined as the total interest divided by the average liabilities in year t. If creditors 
regard loan guarantees provided to affiliates as contingent liabilities, they would demand higher risk premiums when 
the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. This trend makes the cost of debt higher. Therefore, the 
coefficient β1 would be significantly positive. However, providing loan guarantees to affiliates might be regarded as 
a signal of sufficient payment ability. In this case, creditors would demand lower risk premiums when the amount of 
loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. Therefore, the coefficient β1 would be significantly negative in this 
situation. 
 
Other independent variables are used as control variables. SIZE is used to control the effect of the company’s size on 
cost of debt. Sengupta (1998) asserts that the size of a company is negatively associated with its cost of debt. LEV is 
used to control the effect of the debt ratio on cost of debt. Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Francis et al. (2005) found 
positive relationships between debt ratio and cost of debt. ROA indicates a company’s profitability. When the 
profitability of a company is high, a creditor would not demand a high risk premium because its default risk is 
estimated to be low. Therefore, cost of debt would be low when the profitability of a company is high. According to 
Pittman and Fortin (2004), cost of debt is low when the amount of operating cash flow is large. Therefore, CFO is 
expected to be negatively associated with COD. Industry and year dummy variables are also included in model (1) 
to control for the effects of specific industry and economic fluctuations. 
 
4.2. Sample Selection 
 
The sample of this study consists of companies that were listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2004 to 2014. 
Only firm-years whose financial data are available in TS2000 and KisValue are included in the sample. Firm-years 
with fiscal year-ends other than December 31 and those operating in the financial industry were eliminated. The 
final sample consists of 2,660 firm-years. 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
CODt 0.0288 0.0170 0.0159 0.0287 0.0817 
LGRt 0.1307 0.4624 0.0139 0.0479 0.1318 
SIZEt 27.1100 1.6392 25.8827 26.7791 28.1445 
LEVt 1.3991 1.8928 0.5718 0.9969 1.6876 
ROAt 0.0269 0.0742 0.0058 0.0303 0.0624 
CFOt 0.0477 0.0730 0.0064 0.0447 0.0850 
Variable Definitions 
CODt: cost of debt capital in year t; 
LGRt: the amount of loan guarantees provided for affiliates divided by total assets at the end of year t; 
SIZEt: natural logarithm of total asset at the end of year t; 
LEVt: debt ratio at the end of year t; 
ROAt: return on asset in year t; 
CFOt: proportion of operating cash flow on total asset of year t; 
 
 
The mean COD is 0.0288, which shows that the average cost of debt is approximately 3% during the sample period. 
The median COD is 0.0287, suggesting the difference between the mean and median COD value is small. The mean 
LGR is 0.1307, showing that the average loan guarantee provided for affiliates was approximately 13% of total 
assets during the sample period. The mean SIZE is 27.1100, showing that the average total assets of sample 
companies is approximately 594 billion Korean Won. The mean LEV is 1.3991, showing that the average debt ratio 
of sample companies was approximately 140% during the sample period. The mean ROA is 0.0269, showing that the 
average return on assets of the sample companies was approximately 3% during the sample period. The mean CFO 
is 0.0477, showing that the average operating cash flow of sample companies was approximately 5% of total assets 
during the sample period.  
 
5.2. Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables used in the model (1).  
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients 
 LGRt SIZEt LEVt ROAt CFOt 
CODt 0.0120 (0.5364) 
-0.1537 
(<.0001) 
0.2304 
(<.0001) 
-0.3415 
(<.0001) 
-0.2215 
(<.0001) 
TAVt  -0.0603 (0.0019) 
-0.0009 
(0.9624) 
-0.0307 
(0.1135) 
-0.0281 
(0.1477) 
SIZEt   0.1686 (<.0001) 
0.1426 
(<.0001) 
0.1452 
(<.0001) 
LEVt    -0.3029 (<.0001) 
-0.1564 
(<.0001) 
ROAt     0.4402 (<.0001) 
The value in parenthesis is p-value. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables used. 
 
 
LGR is not significantly related to COD. However, it is necessary to include other control variables that might have 
an effect on the cost of debt. SIZE is significantly negatively related to COD, confirming the results of Sengupta 
(1998). This finding indicates that creditors demand lower risk premiums from larger companies. LEV is 
significantly positively related to COD, confirming the findings of Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Francis et al. 
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(2005). This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when debt ratios are high. ROA is 
significantly negatively related to COD. This result indicates that creditors demand lower risk premiums when the 
profitability of a company is high. CFO is significantly negatively related to COD, supporting Pittman and Fortin 
(2004).  
 
5.3. Regression Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis The main independent variable of this study is 
LGRD, which presents whether the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large or not. The coefficient 
of LGRD is 0.0034, which is significant at a 1% level. This result indicates that cost of debt is high when the amount 
of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. Because creditors regard loan guarantees provided to affiliates as 
contingent liabilities, they demand higher risk premium when a company provides larger loan guarantees. This result 
supports those of Shim (1996) and Berkman et al. (2009), who also found that loan guarantees provided to affiliates 
are contingent liabilities. 
 
All control variables used in this study are significantly associated with COD. SIZE is significantly negatively 
associated with COD, supporting the results of Sengupta (1998). LEV was significantly positively related to COD, 
confirming the results of Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Francis et al. (2005). ROA is significantly negatively related 
to COD, indicating that cost of debt is low when the profitability of a company is high. This finding supports this 
study’s expectation. CFO is significantly negatively associated with COD, which supports Pittman and Fortin 
(2004). In order to check the existence of multicollinearity, I calculate a Variance Inflation Factor(VIF) of variables 
used in my multivariate regression model. The maximum value of VIF is only 2.18, which means there is no critical 
problem from multicollinearity in my model. 
 
 
Table 3. Regression Results 
Variables Estimated Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept 0.0339  5.75*** 
LGRDt 0.0034  5.69*** 
SIZEt -0.0005  -2.28** 
LEVt 0.0016  9.43*** 
ROAt -0.0551  -12.14*** 
CFOt -0.0174  -3.85*** 
ID Included 
YD Included 
Observations 2,660 
Adj R2 0.3039 
F-value 20.34*** 
*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. See Model (1) for definitions of the variables used. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigated the relationship between loan guarantees provided to affiliates and cost of debt. Conflicting 
arguments regarding loan guarantees provided to affiliates have prevailed. First, some suggest that loan guarantees 
provided to affiliates would decrease firm value because they are contingent liabilities (Shim, 1996; Berkman et al., 
2009). Second, others suggest firm value is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large 
because loan guarantees would be regarded as a positive indicator of future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The purpose of 
this study was to present additional empirical evidence of these arguments.  
 
The result of this study showed that cost of debt is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is 
large. This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when the amount of loan guarantees provided 
to affiliates is large because they regard loan guarantees as contingent liabilities. Therefore, this result supports the 
assertion that loan guarantees decrease firm value. 
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These findings offer additional evidence of the conflicting arguments surrounding loan guarantees and may help 
increase the understanding of their nature. This study also suggests that the amount of loan guarantees provided to 
affiliates might be classified as a liability in the calculation of the debt ratio and credit rates. 
 
Some limitations were present in this study. First, there are various methods of estimating cost of debt. However, 
this study used only one method. Therefore, measurement error may have been present in the empirical results. 
Second, the dummy variable used in this study served as a main independent variable because a continuous linear 
relation could not be assumed in the relationship between loan guarantees provided to affiliates and cost of debt. A 
limitation was present in the implication of this dummy variable. Therefore, further studies are needed that examine 
the relationship between loan guarantees and cost of debt. 
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